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Labour Market Reforms and Polarization in Korea 
Raymond K.H. Chan* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
From the early 1990s the South Korean government launched a 
series of structural reforms to liberalize and deregulate the economy 
and labour market, in line with its globalization strategy. 
Particularly after the financial crisis, flexible labour market reform 
was one of the major initiatives to keep the Korean economy 
competitive in the global market. This paper describes the rationale 
for flexible labour market reforms in Korea from the early 1990s, 
evaluates their impacts on labour market polarization, and assesses 
the policy responses adopted by Kim Dae-jung and the current Roh 
Moo-hyun governments. It is argued that the flexible labour market 
reform is rather limited in its scale, due to strong opposition from 
unions and employees for different reasons, and the burden is 
disproportionately shouldered by the non-standard workers. As a 
result, a dual and segmented dual labour market has been formed. 
Greater protection to the non-standard workers is required to 
remedy the situation, considering that such reforms are necessary 
for Korea’s economy in the future. 
 
 
Globalization and Flexible Labour Market Reform 
 
Globalization affects employment in developed as well as in 
developing countries. In a global market, the structure of the 
production and the companies involved is more flexible and 
constantly changing. Globalization does not give birth to flexible 
forms of work, but it contributes to their development through the 
national and international network enterprises, the need to make the 
employment structure flexible enough to fit this form of production, 
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and the desire to remain competitive, which are the direct and 
indirect results of globalization. In an increasingly competitive 
economic environment, enterprises have sought more flexible and 
innovative forms of organization and production to heighten economic 
efficiency in response to technological change and consumer 
preferences in quality, service, and variety (ILO, 1998, 2000). 
 
To accommodate this degree of flexibility, a wide variety of 
employment structures are desirable. Basically, the more rigid form 
of full-time, fixed-term contract and long-term employment is 
eliminated and replaced by a diverse pool of workers, including 
part-time, temporary, and self-employed workers. International 
statistics on work have shown this development. This trend is 
accompanied by the increasing individualization of labour conditions 
and contracts, in contrast to collective bargaining and general 
working conditions. 
 
The causes of labour market rigidity are numerous, including 
discouragement of hiring due to restrictive labour legislation, high 
statutory minimum wage, high social contributions and taxation, 
rigid wage levels set by collective bargaining, inadequate training 
and education systems, passive labour market policy, and overly 
generous income substitution benefits that discourage work (Sarfati, 
1999).  Rigid labour regulations, working conditions, and terms of 
employment also act as disincentives to staff recruitment and hence 
unemployment (ILO, 1998). Such restrictions include maximum 
working hours, overtime and overtime pay, leave, and paid holidays. 
While trade unions argue for more protection, some employers seek 
to modify these regulations to make the labour market less rigid.     
 
There are several aspects of flexibility (Confederation of British 
Industry, 1997: 2-3):   
 
1. Numerical flexibility: adjustment of the number of employees to 
meet changing demand and competitive conditions (e.g. 
downsizing). 
2. Flexible working patterns: varying the hours of work (e.g., 
part-time work, shift work, and annualized hours) and hence the 
 3 
types of employment contract (e.g., fixed term and seasonal 
contracts).  
3. Skills/functional flexibility: highly skilled and competent workers 
and free movement of employees between tasks due to flexible 
skills and an absence of demarcation lines. 
4. Wage flexibility: adjustment of wages to correspond to changing 
economic conditions and to company and individual performance.  
5. Geographical mobility: the ability of employees to move freely 
between different regions.  
 
Globalization and the Reforms in South Korea before the 
Financial Crisis 
 
Since the early 1990s South Korea has been part of the general 
movement toward a more flexible labour market. Since 1987, there 
have been changes in the highly centralized and regulated economic 
and labour market structure. The Kim Young-sam government 
(1993-98) launched liberalization and internationalization policies. 
Maintaining the competitiveness of Korean products in the global 
market became a more and more difficult task partly due to wage 
hikes. The increased reliance on exports made products vulnerable to 
the fluctuations of the international market (for example, the 
dropping price of semi-conductors before the financial crisis).  
 
Employers are increasingly constrained by volatile product market 
competition and are also burdened by rigid rules and high wages in 
internal labour markets (Lee, 2000, p. 4). There have been calls to 
reform the enterprises and the labour market structure to meet these 
demands.  Kim Young-sam attempted to apply market principles to 
the labour market to make it more flexible (Kim, 2000; Y.H. Lee, 
2000). Alternative employment patterns and types, such as leased 
labour, contract labour, and part-time work, were not popular 
(KOILAF, 1998).   
 
Since there were no regulations concerning redundancy dismissal, 
flexible labour hours, and labour lease systems, which are features of 
a flexible labour market, the market and its regulators were criticized 
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for being unrealistic and rigid in regulating the terms of employment 
(such as working hours, leave, allowances, and retirement pay).  
 
The Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform was 
formed in May 1996, with the aim of relaxing the labour regulations. 
The proposed revision of the Labor Standards Act on layoff was 
passed by the National Assembly in March 1997, but was boycotted 
by the opposition party. The governing party had to halt the 
provision of layoff for two years to give the government more time 
to lobby support. However, the introduction of a system of flexible 
working hours was adopted, which allow the calculation to be based 
on a bi-weekly or monthly basis.  
 
To smooth the reforms, the Employment Insurance System was 
enacted in 1993 and implemented in 1995. The System has the dual 
role of stabilizing employment while, at the same time, smoothing 
the labour adjustment process when unemployment and 
reemployment are necessary.  
 
Pushing Flexible Labour Market Reform since the Financial 
Crisis  
 
Changes in Employment Status 
 
The Korean financial crisis occurred in November 1997 and brought 
the positive trajectory of economic development to a sudden and 
unexpected halt. As outlined by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (1999), the first phase of the reforms for recovery (i.e., 
from December 1997 to April 1998) was to introduce the corporate 
restructuring and flexible labour principle, establish the Tripartite 
Commission, and legislate the layoff provisions. The second phase, 
from May 1998 to June 1998, witnessed the liberalization of foreign 
investors’ mergers and acquisition of local companies, real estate, 
and equity ownership of private Korean enterprises. The third phase, 
from July 1998 to February 1999, was characterized by massive 
corporate merging and restructuring. The most significant social 
impacts of the crisis were to increase unemployment and decrease 
income in the process of corporate and employment restructuring.  
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With agreement from the trade unions, the clause on layoffs in the 
Labor Standards Act was formally implemented in February 1998, 
though layoffs could only be permitted under the following 
conditions: 1) urgent managerial needs, including transfer, 
acquisition, and merger of business to avoid financial difficulties; 2) 
employers should make every effort to avoid dismissal of workers 
and if dismissal occurs, a fair and rational standard should be in 
place; 3) sincere consultation with the trade union and 60 days, 
advance notice (Article 31, Labor Standards Act).  
 
Another strategy to make the labour market more flexible was to 
legalize the labour dispatch system. The ‘Act Relating to Protection, 
etc, for Dispatched Workers’ was enacted in 1998; it allowed the use 
of a “dispatched worker” in Korea for up to two years in 26 
occupations deemed to require specialized knowledge, skills, and 
experience. The employment could be extended for another year if 
agreed upon by both parties.  
 
Large enterprises were more ready to make good use of 
subcontracting to shift their burdens, due to excessive wage hikes, to 
subcontracted small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), resulting 
in the transition of jobs in SMEs to non-regular ones (Labor Today, 
Issue No.336 - April 13, 2006). The KCTU (1999) argued that the 
government and employers have deliberately enforced labour market 
flexibility: “Employers have sought to suppress the increase in 
regular employment and resorted to expansion of part-time 
employment in their pursuit for labour cost savings, flexible 
employment adjustment, and elastic response to shifts in the 
business demand”.  
 
Together with the rapid expansion of public projects, which provided 
mainly temporary and daily work, the number of irregular or 
non-standard (which mainly refers to temporary and daily) workers 
increased. By 1999, the irregular workers (simply defined as a total 
of temporary and daily workers) accounted for more than 50 per cent 
of the paid workforce (though the share reduced to less than half from 
2003) (Table 1). 
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Nevertheless, there were some debates on the definition of 
non-standard (or irregular, atypical workers) from around 1999, 
when non-standard workers as represented by temporary and daily 
workers began to take up more than half of the waged workers (Ahn, 
2004). The definition of most-frequently referred terms: regular vs 
irregular workers (comprised of temporary and daily workers) 
adopted in the Economically Active Population Survey are as follows,  
 
Regular workers – workers with employment contracts for 1 
year or longer’ and / or ‘workers who have worked for one 
year or longer and are entitled to fringe benefits such as 
legal retirement allowances and bonuses’; 
Temporary workers – ‘workers with employment contracts for 
longer than one month but shorter than one year’; 
Daily workers – ‘those workers who are not regular or temporary 
workers, and with employment contracts for less than one 
month’. 
 
Table 1: Waged workers by employment status, 1990 – 2005 (%) 
 
Wage &  
salary workers 
Regular  
employees 
Temporary 
employees 
Daily  
workers 
1990 100 54.2 29.0 16.8 
1991 100 55.5 28.7 15.7 
1992 100 57.4 27.7 14.9 
1993 100 58.9 26.7 14.4 
1994 100 57.9 27.8 14.3 
1995 100 58.1 27.9 14.0 
1996 100 56.8 29.6 13.6 
1997 100 54.3 31.6 14.1 
1998 100 53.1 32.9 14.0 
1999 100 48.4 33.6 18.0 
2000 100 47.9 34.5 17.6 
2001 100 49.2 34.6 16.2 
2002 100 48.4 34.5 17.2 
2003 100 50.5 34.7 14.8 
2004 100 51.2 34.1 14.7 
2005 100 52.1 33.3 14.6 
Source: Ministry of Labor Website 
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The definitions adopted are rather loosely defined and may not be 
able to reflect the workers’ status and their experience in labour 
market. Therefore, a Supplementary Economically Active Population 
Survey (SEAPS) was conducted annually to collect further data (the 
first survey was in August 2000). The survey asks more questions to 
clarify the employment status, such as starting date, existence of an 
employment contract with period, possibility of renewal, full-time or 
part-time, expected duration of the current employment, coverage of 
social insurance systems, and entitlement of fringe benefits.  
 
Table 2: Employment by types, 2000 - 2003 (%) 
Employed workers 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Workers without fixed term contract 
1. continuing employment, possible  70.1 71.3 73.0 67.2 
Workers without fixed term contract, continuing employment impossible and the 
expected duration  
2. > 3 years  -- 0.5 0.2 0.6 
3. 1 – 3 years 2.3 1.7 1.1 1.8 
4. < 1 year -- 1.7 1.3 1.3 
Sub-total 2.3 3.9 2.6 3.7 
Workers with fixed term contract, continuing employment possible and the duration 
of contract 
5. > 3 years -- 0.4 0.5 0.6 
6. 1 – 3 years 3.4 1.7 1.6 2.6 
7. 1 year -- 1.1 1.5 2.6 
8. < 1 year 3.4 1.7 1.6 2.6 
Sub-total 6.8 4.9 5.2 8.4 
Workers with fixed term contract, continuing employment impossible, and the 
duration of contract 
9. > 3 years -- 0.0 0.0 0.1 
10. 1 – 3 years -- 0.1 0.1 0.2 
11. 1 year 3.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 
12. < 1 year -- 3.9 3.7 5.4 
Sub-total 3.8 4.1 3.9 5.9 
13. part-time workers 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.6 
14. dispatched workers 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 
15. temporary agency workers 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.3 
16. independent contractors 4.3 5.7 5.3 3.9 
17. on-call / daily workers 7.9 2.2 2.9 4.2 
18. tele-workers / home-based workers 1.1 1.6 1.3 0.9 
Sub-total 20.4 16.8 16.5 16.6 
Sources: Supplementary Economically Active Population Survey, various years  
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As reflected by the SEAPS from 2000 to 2003 (Table 2), most of the 
workers belong to the category of waged earners without fixed term 
contract but with possibility of continuing employment, though the 
percentage is declining. That might reflect the traditional 
employment structure in Korea. The percentage of workers with 
fixed term contract is increasing (i.e. 10.6% to 14.3%). In 2003, 
among the fixed term contract workers, 56% are with less than 1 
year contract; and 41.3% of them expected their contract not to be 
renewed. The share of all other forms of non-standard work reduced 
from 20.4% to 18.6% in the period.   
 
The latest SEAPS, conducted in August 2005, provides us the most 
updated information on employment status. Waged workers with a 
fixed term contract continued to increase and reached 18.2% of the 
total (17.1% in 2004). Among them, 56.7% had a less than one year 
contract, though more than half (i.e. 55.4%) of the fixed term 
contract workers have had their contract renewed. Part-time workers 
increased to 7.0% of total waged workers. 
 
The increase in fixed term contracts is not only due to the economic 
recession in 2003 and 2004, but also seems to be attributable to the 
structural shift in the labour market – implying that companies are 
increasingly preferring non-standard workers for greater ease in 
wage or employment adjustment. Another reason is more companies 
are putting in place a trial period before turning the workers into 
standard positions. According to the Workplace Panel Study by the 
Korea Labor Institute (KLI) in 2002, 65% of the responding 
workplaces have utilized nonstandard work, and the main reasons 
were more flexibility of employment (30.3%) and reduction of 
labour costs (32.1%) (Ahn, 2004: 16).  
 
Though the data collected from the EAPS and SEAPS seemed not 
that alarming, further analysis of the data clearly demonstrates a 
worrying trend of labour market segmentation.  
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Inequality – Women’s Employment 
 
Compared to the overall distribution, female waged workers have a 
higher percentage of workers as temporary and daily workers (see 
Table 3).   
 
Table 3: Employment by status for female  
waged workers Unit: 1,000 persons / % of total  
Year 
Female  
waged workers 
Regular 
employees 
Temporary 
employees 
Daily  
workers 
2000 5397 1679 (31.1) 2496 (46.2) 1222 (22.6) 
2001 5609 1861 (33.2) 2589 (46.2) 1159 (20.7) 
2002 5857 1968 (33.6) 2682 (45.8) 1207 (20.6) 
2003 5970 2109 (35.3) 2826 (47.3) 1036 (17.4) 
2004 6237 2269 (36.4) 2869 (46.0) 1079 (17.3) 
2005 6391 2439 (38.2) 2874 (45.0) 1079 (16.9) 
Source: Economically Active Population Survey, various years 
 
Wage Gap 
 
The wage gap between the standard and the non-standard workers is 
widening in recent years. According to the SEAPS in August 2005, 
the hourly wages of wage-earners was KRW 9,263 for regular 
jobs and KRW 6,526 for non-regular jobs. The hourly rate of 
non-regular jobs was only 70.5% of the regular jobs, compared 
to 73.5% in 2004.  
 
Among them, the non-regular workers at small or medium-sized 
businesses amounted to only 42.9% of that of regular workers at 
large enterprises. Compared to 2004’s growth rate, the hourly 
wage of regular workers was 5.8% compared to those of 
non-regular workers at a mere 1.3%. After adjusting the impacts of 
factors such as age, experience, education and other attributes, 
irregular workers are paid approximately 20% to 27% less than a 
regular worker receives (Jones, 2005: 5).  
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Table 4: Wage and wage growth rate for regular and  
non-regular workers, 2000 - 2004    Unit: in 1000 KRW 
Waged workers Aug 2000 Aug 2001 Aug 2002 Aug 2003 Aug 2004 
Regular 1,527 1,649 (8.0) 1,769 (7.3) 1,958 (10.7) 2,036 (4.0)
Temporary / daily 783 843 (7.6) 901 (7.0) 952 (5.6) 989 (4.0)
Wage gap (%) 51.3 51.1 51.0 48.6 48.6 
Source: Hwang & Jeong, 2005: Table 12 
 
Fringe Benefit & Social Insurance Coverage   
It was found that, in 2003, longer-term contract employees with 
continuing employment possible enjoyed the highest 
participation rate, and lower participation rate among those with 
shorter contract with renewal impossible, and most forms of 
non-standard employment (Table 5).  
Table 5: Coverage of social insurance by types of employment (%) 
Employed workers None   EI   HI   NP All 
Workers without fixed term contract 
1. continuing employment, possible 24.6 1.2 1.1 0.1 58.7 
Workers without fixed term contract, continuing employment impossible and the 
expected duration  
2. > 3 years  65.2 3.4 2.2 0.0 23.6 
3. 1 – 3 years 77.8 3.2 2.0 0.8 12.7 
4. < 1 year 83.1 2.1 2.1 0.0 10.1 
Workers with fixed term contract, continuing employment possible and the duration 
of contract 
5. > 3 years 2.2 1.1 1.1 0.0 84.4 
6. 1 – 3 years 7.6 0.0 1.4 0.0 84.1 
7. 1 year 2.7 0.3 1.6 0.8 23.7 
8. < 1 year 65.9 2.2 1.6 0.8 23.7 
Workers with fixed term contract, continuing employment impossible, and the 
duration of contract 
9.  > 3 years 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 60.0 
10. 1 – 3 years 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 73.1 
11. 1 year 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 72.7 
12. < 1 year 85.5 1.0 0.9 0.0 10.0 
13. part-time workers 95.7 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.4 
14. dispatched workers 39.4 3.2 3.2 0.0 50.0 
15. temporary agency workers 23.0 1.9 13.4 0.0 51.6 
16. independent contractors 72.6 1.8 2.5 0.2 18.5 
17. on-call / daily workers 98.0 1.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 
18. tele-workers / home-based workers 93.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 
Source: Supplementary Survey of the Economically Active Population, 2003 
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From the SEAPS – 2005, unequal treatment among those with fixed 
term contract and daily workers was clearly demonstrated. Fixed 
term workers enjoy a higher percentage of entitlement in these fringe 
benefits: retirement pay (43.8% vs 0.1%); bonus payment (38.9% vs 
0.1%); overtime allowance (31.0% vs 1.7%); and paid leave (34.5% 
vs 01.%).  
 
Another worrying trend is the rate of participation in social 
insurance by non-regular workers which was only less than half 
of that of regular employees. The participation rate of various 
social insurance schemes by non-regular workers, which was on 
the increase until 2004, began to decline in 2005. For national 
pension participation rate, the rates of regular and non-regular 
workers are 75.7% and 36.6%. For health insurance, the rates of 
regular and non-regular workers are 75.9% and 37.7%. For 
employment insurance, the gap was smaller with 63.8% of 
regular workers and 34.5% of non-regular workers participating 
(Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Participation Rate of Social Insurance Schemes  
by Type of Employment  Unit: 1,000 persons, % 
Schemes Workers August 2002 August 2003 August 2004 August 2005
Total wage workers 7,392 (52.7) 8,163 (57.7) 8,683 (59.5) 9,191 (61.4)
Regular 6,405 (62.9) 6,757 (70.8) 6,659 (72.5) 7,184 (75.7)
National 
pension 
Non-regular 987 (25.7) 1,405 (30.5) 2,024 (37.5) 2,008 (36.6)
Total wage workers 7,785 (55.5) 8,422 (59.5) 8,945 (61.3) 9,264 (61.9)
Regular 6,681 (65.6) 6,919 (72.5) 6,782 (73.8) 7,196 (75.9)
Health 
insurance 
Non-Regular 1,105 (28.8) 1,504 (32.6) 2,163 (40.1) 2,068 (37.7)
Total wage workers 6,730 (48.0)  7,048 (49.8) 7,601 (52.1)  7,943 (53.1)
Regular 5,722 (56.2)  5,701 (59.7) 5,655 (61.5)  6,050 (63.8)
Employment 
insurance 
Non-regular 1,007 (26.2)  1,347 (29.2) 1,946 (36.1)  1,893 (34.5)
Source: Supplementary Survey of the Economically Active Population, various years. 
 
SMEs and Non-Standard Employment 
 
Results from the latest SEAPS also show that the share of 
non-standard workers is much higher among the SMEs. 50.4% of 
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them were working in very small sized establishments with fewer 
than 5 employees, while only 17% in establishment with 300 
workers or more are non-standard workers (Ahn, 2004: 12). It is 
already acknowledged that wages and benefits are less favourable in 
the SMEs than in large enterprises.  
 
The Policy Responses  
 
Immediately following the financial crisis, the Korean government 
adopted a variety of policies to address and ease the negative 
impacts of flexible labour market reforms and the massive layoff. 
The minimum wage law was extended to cover all workplaces in 
2000. Beginning in July 2000, industrial accident compensation 
insurance was available in all workplaces, regardless of size. The 
protection of daily workers has been strengthened.  They became 
eligible for unemployment insurance in 2001. Measures have been 
taken to expand the former Livelihood Protection Act, which was 
enacted in 1961. The revision waived the eligibility criteria of an 
asset check, in order to give protection to those who are unemployed 
but not eligible for unemployment benefits. As well as strengthening 
its roles of providing protection to the people, the government also 
strengthened the employment training and placement services, and 
set up Job Centres nationwide.  
 
The overall goals of the policy responses were to strengthen the 
flexibility of labour market, in terms of functional, skills, and 
numerical flexibility, while, at the same time, protecting a workforce 
that is facing an economic downturn, industrial restructuring, layoffs, 
and high unemployment rates. These goals were reflected in the 
two-pronged reforms adopted by Korean government that attempted 
to tackle the crisis and achieve a balanced development among 
political democratization, economic reforms, and social development 
- described by the term ‘Productive Welfare’.  
 
The Tripartite Commission set up the ‘Special Committee on 
Measures for Non-regular Workers’ in 2001 and eventually agreed 
on the following items in principle: to improve the measures to 
determine the size and scope of non-regular workers and relevant 
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statistics; reinforcement of labour inspection; expansion of social 
insurance coverage; and expansion of vocational ability 
development. 
 
The Commission also reached a Social Pact for Job Creation on 
December 2003; and the Agreement on Vocational Training for 
SMEs and Non-regular Workers in March 2005. The participating 
parties call for actions to narrow the gap in working conditions by 
asking the large companies not to transfer their own labour cost to 
their subcontractors without justifiable reasons; business not to 
unfairly discriminate against non-regular workers; improvement of 
vocational ability programmes; and the government to take active 
measures to redress unfair discrimination between standard and 
non-standard workers.  
 
The current Roh government declared the protection of non-standard 
workers from abuse and discriminatory treatment as its labour 
market policy basic principles, while accepting the existence and 
function of non-standard employment. The most controversial step 
was the new bill – ‘The Act on the Protection of Fixed Term and 
Part-time Employees’ and amendment to the ‘Act on the Protection 
of Dispatch Employees’, presented to the National Assembly in 
November 2004.  
The main content of the bills include:  
1. Unjustifiable discriminatory practices against workers with 
fixed-term contracts, part-time employees and temporary agency 
workers are prohibited.  
2. Firms must establish a written contract when hiring fixed term 
and part-time workers. 
3. The maximum duration of fixed term contracts is extended from 
one to three years (not applicable to aged 50 and above). Firms 
cannot dismiss workers after three years of contract work, even 
when their contract expires. 
4. Overtime work by part-time employees is limited to 12 hours a 
week. 
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5. The maximum period for employing temporary agency workers 
is extended from two to three years (no maximum period for 
aged 50 and above). 
6. The use of temporary agency workers is expanded from 26 
occupations at present to all occupations.  
 
The government repeatedly argued that these bills could protect the 
job security and improve the working conditions of non-standard 
workers. Nevertheless, this proposal met with criticism from the 
trade unions, employees and the opposition parties, and was 
postponed repeatedly for decision at the National Assembly.  The 
trade unions argued that the bills would only increase the number of 
non-standard workers and make their job status more unstable. They 
called for equal treatment of regular and irregular workers.  
 
The employers argued that the proposal would only make the labour 
market more rigid. The Korea Employers Federation threatened the 
government with a mass exodus of businesses if it continues to 
favour trade unions (as a matter of fact, the overseas direct 
investment has increased from USM$ 3,686 to USM$ 6,398 from 
2002 to 2005). It insists that if salaries of non-regular workers are 
raised by law to the level of regular workers’, businesses will have to 
shoulder an additional W42.6 trillion (US$42.6 billion) in cost, of 
which 93.2% will have to be borne by SMEs. The Federation’s 
chairman, Lee Soo-young, warned that “If the government and 
politicians favour only trade unions, as they do now, business people 
will go on a strike. In other words, we will shut down and leave for 
China, India and Bangladesh, which will result in a shrinking job 
market and increasing unemployment”. (Chosun Ilbo, 10 February 
2006)  
 
The ongoing debate was also focused on the period that temporary 
workers can be hired freely and the protection of them after that 
period. Trade unions (e.g. KCTU) demanded the companies to hire 
the temporary staff freely for one year (in some cases, two years), 
and they should be converted as permanent staff after this. But, the 
employers argued that companies should be allowed to hire 
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temporary workers for up to three years freely and then restricted in 
laying off temporary workers after that. Though the government 
proposed a compromise of two years in March 2006, the employers 
say they cannot bear the burden of turning non-regular workers to 
regular workers. (Korea Herald, 2 March 2006) 
 
The latest effort by the government to get the bills passed through 
the National Assembly was to promulgate the ‘5-Year Plan of 
Comprehensive Measures for Non-Regular Workers’, making 
promises to improve the protection,1  if the National Assembly 
passed at its extra-ordinary session last April.  However, the bills 
were once again postponed, this time due to opposition from the 
Grand National Party.  
 
The Dilemma of Reform and Protection  
 
The use of non-standard workers may have its own merits both to 
the employers and employees (though to a lesser extent the latter). 
The use of non-standard workers can enable businesses to cope 
flexibly with fluctuations in the market.  The use of part-time 
workers may also allow the workers to balance their own personal 
needs and their work. The flexible labour reform has attempted to 
modify the rather rigid labour market in Korea. The financial crisis 
has helped to accelerate the reforms that could not be achieved 
before 1997.  
 
Nevertheless, flexible labour market policies have produced a more 
uncertain employment prospect in Korea.  The massive layoffs and 
new employer-employee relationship have weakened the ties 
between companies and employees and there is a lower level of 
loyalty (Park & Yu, 2001, p. 2). Although the rising proportion of 
non-regular workers helps to contain the labour costs and increases 
employment flexibility, it has a negative impact on both equity and 
efficiency over the long term due to polarization (Jones, 2005).  
                                                 
1 Including loan and extended benefit; expansion of the application of the Labor 
Standards Act to enterprises with fewer than 4 employees and introduce the retirement 
pension system in enterprises with fewer than 5 employees; promotion of healthy use 
of non-regular workers if that fit to the workers’ need (e.g., child care) ; improve 
unfair trade practices between contractors and subcontractors. 
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While regular workers enjoy better protection, irregular workers are 
increasingly in a vulnerable position (Choi, 2000). As revealed 
above, a dual and segmented labour market has been formed, even 
though the number of non-standard workers remains stable in the 
past two to three years. The non-regular workers face a rather low 
rate of moving to regular employment, i.e. 15%, compared to an 
average of 30% in advanced OECD areas, and over 40% in Ireland, 
Portugal and Denmark (Labor Today, Issue No.336, April 13, 2006).  
 
As argued by Kim and Cheon, “regular workers in unionized 
companies receive legal protection under the employment protection 
laws and the internal labour market practices of corporations. On the 
other hand, the turnover rate for irregular workers and employees of 
small and medium sized companies is getting very high and their 
wages respond sensitively to economic situations” (2004:4). They 
concluded that flexibility in Korea was achieved not by reforms in 
legal mechanisms, but by the wider utilization of irregular workers. 
An assessment by the IMD and the World Economic Forum on the 
formal legal and regulatory framework showed that the labour 
regulations and hiring and firing practices in Korea have in fact been 
becoming more rigid from 2000 to 2003 (Table 7) 
 
Table 7: IMD and World Economic Forum Assessment of Flexibility in Korea 
Year Labour regulations (1) Hiring and Firing Practices (2) 
2000 4.57 -- 
2001 4.08 4.0 
2002 3.74 3.8 
2003 2.61 3.6 
(1) 0 = not flexible enough; 10 = flexible enough 
(2) 1 = impeded by regulations; 7 = flexibly determined by employers 
Source: Kim & Cheon, 2004: 9-10 
 
The current government’s move to enact the bill on protecting 
irregular workers reflects the reality of having more and more 
unprotected non-standard, fixed term contract workers in Korea. Yet, 
the difficulties of getting the bills passed in the past 19 months also 
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reflects the deeply divided interests among the different stakeholders 
on these issues.  
 
Nevertheless, considering the increasingly global competition and 
volatility of the market, a more flexible labour market in Korea is 
preferable, even though at the expense of a stable employment. 
While further relaxing the clause protecting the regular employees 
seems unrealistic, at least in the coming years, to expand and 
improve the protection for those who might face difficulties in the 
uncertain labour market is desirable. Legislation against abusing 
non-standard employment through repeated contracting, expanding 
social insurance coverage, and rectifying unfair treatment (e.g. salary, 
bonus, overtime allowance, etc.) are all necessary. The direction 
might not be equalize the treatment, but at least to narrow down the 
gap.     
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